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ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ROCKS OR
PEBBLES ON THE SIDEWALK WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
NEIL'S INJURIES.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that "[n]o evidence has been presented that the

rocks were the cause of the fall" and summary judgment for ZZYZX was granted.
(Memorandum Decision of Trial Court. R. 340). There is sufficient evidence, however, that
the rocks or pebbles caused Neil' s fall and therefore summaryjudgment should not have been
granted and this Court should reverse the lower court's decision.
A.

Neil Has Presented Evidence That Is Not Speculative and Should
Therefore be Presented to a Jury.

In determining whether a breach of duty proximately caused an injury, unless the
evidence is speculative, the jury decides whether the cause is proximate or too attenuated to
be attributed to the defendant. It is well established that "[s]ome or all of the links [of
proximate cause] may depend upon inferences." Sumsion v. Streator-Smith. Inc.. 103 Utah
44, 132 P.2d 680, 682 (1943). Additionally, "[bjecause negligence cases often require the
drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges,
'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.'"
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919P.2d568,571 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182. 183 (Utah 1991)).

1

"Inference" and "speculation" are both terms which have been defined.

An

"inference" is "a deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience teaches us
can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." State v. Hesten 2000 UT
App 159, f 16, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting Manchester v. Dugan. 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968)).
"Speculation" is defined as the "act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there
is no certain knowledge." Id (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999)).
The evidence and witness testimony in this case are sufficient to conclude that Neil's
injuries resulted from slipping on the rocks or pebbles present on the walkway. At the very
least the evidence provides a fact issue as to the fall. First, it is undisputed that Neil fell.
Neil's own testimony along with the testimony of every other witness to the accident support
this fact. Next is the contention that Neil fell because of something that he stepped on.
ZZYZX does not dispute this point either, and acknowledges that an inference can be made
that "a finder of fact could reasonably infer that there was something under his foot. Human
experience could easily tell a fact finder that when it feels like there is something under your
foot there usually is." (ZZYZX's Appellee Brief, page 8).
While Defendant attacks the evidence as speculative, Defendant itself speculates that
only the intervention of a third-party could move the pebbles onto the sidewalk ignoring the
effect of wind, rain, garden hoses, or snow.
The next link in the chain of causation is the contention that the thing Neil slipped on
was rocks or pebbles. Because witness testimony establishes that there were rocks or pebbles
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littering the ground where Neil slipped (See the deposition of Paula Hone pages 15 and 18;
the affidavit of Dustin Hone pagel 1), normal human experience allows for the inference that
Neil slipped on one or more of these rocks or pebbles. This inference is based on undisputed
facts, that Neil slipped, that he slipped on something he stepped on, and that there were rocks
or pebbles littering the walkway where Neil slipped. ZZYZX does not refute these facts.
ZZYZX does contend, however, that an inference that Neil slipped on a rock or pebble
is not supported by the evidence and is merely speculative. ZZYZX argues that the evidence
"suggests the possibility of it being a rock that was stepped on, but there is no certain
knowledge. Instead, such a finding would fit the definition of speculation as theorizing about
matters over which there is no certain knowledge." (ZZYZX's Appellee Brief, page 9).
Such an interpretation would effectively deny the courts' explanation of what constitutes an
inference. If certain knowledge were required for an inference then no inference would be
needed at all. The evidence for the fact itself would be available. Such an impossibly high
standard precluding any inference could not be what the Court meant in Hester when it stated
that an inference is "a deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience teaches
us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." Hester, 3 P.3d at 730.
Alternatively, there are certain and undisputed facts in this case from which the
inference can be made. It is undisputed and certain that Neil fell, tripping or slipping on
something. It is undisputed and certain that when Neil slipped he felt something under is
foot. It is also undisputed and certain that Paula and Dustin both looked around the area of
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the fall andfoundonly rocks or pebbles and no other objects that Neil could have slipped

or pebble. Such a conclusion based on inference is far from mere speculation, indeed it is
the only conclusion that normal human experience would suggest. In slip and fall cases such
as this, an application of the judgment of the jury is almost always required as it is nearl>
ill lpossible to find tl: le specifics of wl iat cai lsed tl ic accidei it

\ ftei a serioi is fall. I "c J lla

looked in the area and found the pebbles on the walkway - a very normal reaction-as you
walk to the cafe you would not make a careful examination of the area before the fall.
Inferences are determine
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I hus, by granting summary judgment the lower court effectively denied the application of
human experience in weighing the inferential evidence in this case. Because the evidence
available is not speculative in nature but can justifiably lead to appropriate inferences about
causation, the evidence should Live gone fn ,i |iin
B.

linn Minimum ftidunuiil w as rttor.

Utah C !ase Law Supports This Interpretation of What Constitutes a
Reasonable Inference.

In Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the court
illustrates the princii •
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evidence does not have to be obtained prior to the accident. While it is true, as ZZYZX
points out, that Silcox differs factually from the case at hand, the same principle applies.
(ZZYZX's Appellee Brief page 11). In Silcox, the court allowed inferential evidence to
determine how the water that the plaintiff slipped r, •
4
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appropriately established that the water likely came from bags of melting ice 115 feet away.
Although inferential evidence is used in the case at hand not to establish how the rocks or
pebbles got onto the sidewalk but rather that it was a rock or pebble that Neil slipped on, the
same principles apply. There is nothing in Silcox to suggest otherwise. Indeed inferential
evidence is clearly not limited in application to establishing only how the item slipped on
came to be located where it was, but can be used for any link in the chain of causation.
Silcox is clearly analogous to the case at hand. In Silcox inferences were allowed to establish
that the wet spot on the floor caused the plaintiffs fall. There was no direct evidence that
the water caused the fall, only that the water was present in the area after the fall. In this case
inferences establish that a rock or pebble caused Neil's fall. Defendant's effort to distinguish
Silcox is a distinguishment without a difference - the holding is applicable to the case now
before the Court. In Silcox the witness believed the water caused the fall and here the
witnesses believed the pebbles caused the fall.
ZZYZX next argues that the court in Nelson By and Through Stuckman never
reached a decision on what constitutes permissible inferential evidence. ZZYZX does
concede, however, that "the Nelson decision would allow a jury to rely on 'other evidence'
which would support a reasonable inference that Neil stepped on a rock," (ZZYZX's
Appellee Brief page 13). Such "other evidence" is abundant in this case. At least two
witnesses have testified that they saw rocks or pebbles littering the walkway where Neil
slipped. (See the deposition of Paula Hone pages 15 and 18; the affidavit of Dustin Hone
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Neil has testified.
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dep< >siti( )i i c >f Neil I L wit : j: >i igi 2" 7) Such undisputed facts provide the basis for inferential
evidence that would clearly be permissible under Nelson. The inference thus established
would demonstrate that Neil's fall was caused more likely than not by slipping on a rock or
pebble.
;' / \7\

u Mn •

\ • - ;, i ti 11 age from Nelson stating that'' [ a] mere possibility of such

causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture,
or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the coiirt to direct a
verdict for the defendai it

^cison at 5' 7 1 (quoting \V I >age K eei itori et a,L, Prosser and

Keeton on the Law of Torts $ 41, at 265 (5 th ed. 1984), quoted in Weber v. Springville City,
725 P.2d 1360,1367 (Utah 1986)). The facts establishing the inferential evidence that Neil
slipped on a rocks or pebbles are more than mere speculation Itideed, tllese facts amoi
more th in :in o n i k halamrd piopoMlimi. i'.-v;.i: , -here was nothing else but rocks or
pebbles found in the vicinity of the accident, the contention that Neil slipped on rocks or
pebbles is more than likely. Thus, the inferential evidence in the matter at hand exceeds the
Nelson sta •. • \

e case at *

lere are the statemet its of three witnesses accn \ • = -: - *: •

as evidence of the cause of the fall with no contradicting evidence. The evidence is "more
likely than not" that the pebbles caused the fall.
77\ / \ next attacks the reasoning from Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 388 ! . :
K)9 (I ]'1 ah 1964) as applied

;
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that caused the plaintiff to slip came to be located where it was. ZZYZX argues that this
distinction precludes the use of the principles the court permits in Campbell for establishing
inferential evidence. That the inferential evidence is used to establish a different link in the
chain of causation in the matter at hand does not preclude its use. Rather, the Campbell
Court provides guidelines for the use of any inferential evidence, finding that a reasonable
inference is correctly found where based on the greatest probability explaining the event.
Campbell 388 P.2d at 410-1L
ZZYZX also argues that a better reading of this case would be that the standard set
forth in Campbell requires inferential evidence to be "more likely than not," or more likely
than "the combined likelihood that Neil stepped on any other item." (ZZYZX's Appellee
Brief pages 15 and 16). Clearly the standard from Campbell even if categorized as "more
likely than not" does not mean more likely than the aggregate of all other possibilities. Such
a reading is not supported by the case, Defendant has manufactured his "combined"
likelihood.

Rather is entails that the inference is more likely than any other single

explanation. Additionally, even were this the true standard to come out of the Campbell
decision, it is clearly met here. That Neil slipped on one of the rocks or pebbles littering the
walkway is more likely than not. Indeed it is the only conclusion the evidence supports, and
the only one suggested by either side in this case. ZZYZX provides no reasonable alternative
to the evidence presented in behalf of Neil Hone. Defendant's claim that this is "pure

7

speculation" would require absolute certainty thusdepi i\ it lg the ji u ) of draw ingt 1 ic inference
fi < : i i .the 1 esl irr ; : ii; Defend; till Is sh i:i| >b ' 1 i: ying t o p i ec : tit i;j )1 . t h e ji lry function.
ZZYZX next attacks the analysis applied from Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P 2d
477 (Utah 1985). In Lindsay, a puddle of water caused an accident. It was not known
whether the water was spilled by tl le waitress who bi oi igl it it. , tl ic plaintiff, ii ic plaii itiff s
i umpamon oi .iimtlia patron Because there was no evidence making one possibility more
likely than any of the others, the Court m Lindsay granted summary judgment to the
defendant. ZZYZX argues that the Lindsay decision should apply in this case. The facts at
1 iand, however, suggest the opposite, Defei idai it: s at ial> sis 31 \h - applies w 1 iei I the facts
su[:}'-

= .nporary condition created by a third party not germane to the case now before

the Court.
Unlike in the Lindsay case, there are available facts which make the contention that
it was a rock or pebbIt lli.il Nnil ;li|>pul uii ittun Itl rh Ihan an1, nllm n iitundion. As
previously noted, only rocks or pebbles were found in the vicinity of the fall. In fact, Paula
made several subsequent visits to the walkway for the express purpose of observing its
condition, and each time it was littered v ' it! t rocks or pebbles. (See affidav it of f ai ih , I lone ,
1" 10).

In Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc.. 775 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) the plaintiff
was unable to provide any evidence of what might have caused her to slip and fall. Thus, the
coi n t appropi lately gram . *

.

ZZYZX argues " • at *he case
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at hand fall somewhere between Lindsay and Dybowski. This is incorrect, however, as in
both of these cases the plaintiff could not provide "any" evidence to show that their
contentions against the defendants were more likely than any other possible explanation of
their falls. Such is not the case here. Ample evidence has been proffered that there were
rocks or pebbles and gravel littering the walkway where Neil slipped. No other evidence has
been advanced to show any alternative that might have caused Neil to slip. Defendant's
theory would require an impossible proof of a certainty. Thus, it is more likely than not that
Neil slipped on rocks or pebbles and the inferential evidence is proper.
C.

In Granting Summary Judgment the Trial Court Inappropriately
Weighed the Evidence.

It is well established that "[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure
to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence."
Holbrook Co. v.Adams, 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). All of the available evidence in this
case leads to a conclusion that Neil slipped on rocks or pebbles. At the very least, the
evidence is enough to create a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary
judgment. Summary judgment should not be used "to deny parties the right to a trial to
resolve disputed issues of fact." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).
By determining that "[n]o evidence has been presented that the rocks were the cause of the
fall," the trial court weighed the available evidence and determined that it could not sustain
an inference and was merely speculation. (Memorandum Decision of Trial Court, R. 340).

9

ZZYZX argues that Paula's evidence and conclusion of what caused the fall does not
classify as evidence because it is not based on her own direct knowledge but merely her
observations. If direct knowledge is the standard then Paula would have had to watch under
Neil's feet, an impossible burden. Assuming that she could have seen under Neil's feet, there
is no guarantee she would have been able to see a small pebble.
Additionally, affirming the grant of summaryjudgment for ZZYZX would require this
Court also to weigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and would therefore
violate the basis for a grant of summary judgment. Thus, this Court should reverse the lower
court's grant of summary judgment.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE BECAUSE ZZYZX'S
BREACH OF DUTY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.
In its second point, Defendant argues that breach of duty has not been established.

In fact, on the issue of the breach of duty, the trial court specifically found that the breach of
duty presented a material fact in dispute and did not grant summary judgment on this issue.
The issue of duty was resolved by the trial court as insufficient to grant summary judgment.
Since causation and not breach of duty is at issue in this appeal Defendant's argument is
inappropriate.
Despite the fact that breach of duty is not before the Court. The breach of duty in this
case is based on ZZYZX's landscaping constituting a permanent hazard. Permanent hazards
include a negligent defendant's "method of operation where it is reasonably foreseeable that
the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition."
10

Canfield v.

Albertsons, Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992). "Foreseeability and inherent
danger are key elements of a negligence action under the [permanent hazard] theory of
liability." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah 1996). The law
clearly establishes liability if a business owner negligently chooses a method of operation
where it is reasonably foreseeable that inherently dangerous conditions will occur.
ZZYZX cites oral arguments in this case as the basis for the lower court's ruling. (See
ZZYZX's Appellee Brief page 21). Such is not the case. The Court's ruling was based upon
causation not breach of duty.
A.

ZZYZX Employs a Method of Operation Which Creates a Permanent
Hazard.

Temporary hazards are treated as permanent hazards if they are caused by a permanent
structure.
Although it [involved] a temporary situation in that the fall was on some
vegetable leaves in front of a produce counter, it also [came] within the second
class of cases above referred to. It was pointed out that in [the defendant's]
permanent structure the vegetable racks were slanted in such a way that it
should have been anticipated that leaves would fall on the floor.
Id at 177 (citing Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.. 186 Kan. 75,348 P.2d 1022,
1029-30). There is no question that the rocks or pebbles that Neil slipped upon were
transitory in nature. However, there is also no question that the rocks or pebbles came from
the landscaped area adjacent to the sidewalk. This case is more closely aligned to the cases
where the box in the aisle is inferred to have been a hazard created by the property owner.

11

ZZYZX argues that Neil has failed to present any evidence that the rocks or pebbles
he slipped on were present for any length of time. (See ZZYZX Appellee Brief page 23).
This is not a notice case requiring proof of the time of the temporary hazard. This is not an
issue in this case. Under a permanent hazard theory of liability, it is not required to show that
the defendant had notice of the condition. Rather, liability comes from the negligent decision
to choose a mode of operation which creates reasonably foreseeable dangerous conditions.
ZZYZX also contends that Neil cannot assert liability based on a chosen "method of
operation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will
create a dangerous condition." (See ZZYZX's Appellee Brief page 23). Such is not the case.
At no time has Neil argued that the acts of third parties created the dangerous conditions. It
has never been claimed that the rocks or pebbles were on the sidewalk due to actions of third
parties. Indeed the rocks or pebbles could have migrated naturally from wind, rain or other
naturally occurring events or from the employees hosing down the walkway areas. It is clear,
however, that ZZYZX knew or should have known that rocks or pebbles moved one way or
another from the landscaping down to the sidewalk, thus creating a foreseeable dangerous
condition.
Even if the rocks or pebbles that caused Neil's fall were moved by third parties,
Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992) establishes that permanent
hazards include a negligent defendant's "method of operation where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition." Id.

12

at 1226. It is entirely expectable that children, animals or other patrons will walk through
or near the rocks and pebbles next to the sidewalk on their way into and out of ZZYZX's
establishment. And though ZZYZX argues that it cannot be expected that a customer or
other person will remove rocks or pebbles and deposit them on the sidewalk, such conclusion
is only their conjecture; but it is for the jury to determine what a customer might be expected
to do. (See ZZYZX's Appellee Brief page 24).
ZZYZX further argues that the rule from Canfield is that the "method of operation"
refers to the manner in which an entity conducts its business. (See ZZYZX's Appellee Brief
page 24). This could clearly limit the application of Canfield beyond the court's holding.
The Canfield Court never limited the term "method of operation" to company procedures
involving third party actions as ZZYZX would suggest. ZZYZX fails to cite any other case
law supporting that interpretation. Furthermore, the ZZYZX company policy for the
manager to inspect the sidewalk establishes that there were expected dangers that might be
on the walkways and was both foreseeable and known to ZZYZX.
ZZYZX also argues that an inherent danger cannot be established by a failure to
inspect. ZZYZX fails to cite any case law in support of that conclusion, however.
Finally, ZZYZX argues that Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah
1996) demonstrates the applicable standard for what constitutes a foreseeable and inherently
dangerous condition. In that case the Court said the plaintiff alleged that it was foreseeable
customers would eat ice cream in the deli which would cause slick areas on the floor, making

13

a dangerous condition. The court found that the plaintiff provided no evidence of an
inherently dangerous and foreseeable condition. Such is not the case in the matter at hand.
There is ample evidence that rocks or pebbles on the sidewalk outside of the ZZYZX
establishment present a foreseeable and inherent danger. Such evidence includes the
testimonies of Neil, Paula and Dustin, the subsequent visits by Paula revealing that the
condition is ongoing, and most telling of all, the fact that the company's managers are
regularly required to check the area. Such evidence shows that in this case, unlike in
Schnuphase, the inherently dangerous condition of the sidewalk was reasonably foreseeable.
B.

ZZYZX's Landscaping is a Permanent Structure Causing Temporary
Hazards.

The landscaping at the establishment in this case is permanent in nature. It had not
been altered for at least two years prior to Neil's accident. (R. 272). ZZYZX offers no
argument or case law that would categorize the landscaping as anything other than a
permanent structure. Instead ZZYZX contends that Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co.. 186 Kan. 75, 348 P.2d 1022 and Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc.. 538 P.2d
175,176 (Utah 1975) demonstrate that the dangerous condition must occur naturally, absent
any intervention by third parties.
That standard is met in the matter at hand. Besides Paula's returned visits to
photograph the continuous coverage of rocks and pebbles on the sidewalk, a report by an
engineering firm that studied the grade of the landscaping included a picture that showed
landscaping rocks or pebbles present on the sidewalk in the area where Neil fell. (R. 260).
14
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Normal human inference also provides that rocks or pebbles and gravel would migrate out
of the landscaping and onto the sidewalk due to wind, rain, or snow. Thus, no intervening
third party is required to create the dangerous condition.
Furthermore, requiring evidence that the rocks or pebbles moved on their own would
be an impossible and ludicrous burden. Human experience would acknowledge that small
pebbles interspersed among the larger rocks or pebbles in the landscaping could be moved
by wind, rain, snow, hose water, small children, or other causes. Thus making the condition
foreseeable. That is exactly the reason why juries are allowed to make inferences.
Because the rocks or pebbles and gravel could have moved onto the sidewalk either
by third party intervention, or in the alternative, by wind, rain, snow, employee action, the
landscaping created a dangerous condition.
CONCLUSION
The grant of summary judgment by the trial court was erroneous. The Defendant
ZZYZX is liable for creating a permanent hazard. Affidavits and depositions establish that
the permanent rock landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk where the Plaintiff Neil Hone fell
was a reasonably foreseeable hazard that was inherently dangerous if not properly
maintained. The evidence establishes that the most likely cause of Neil's fall was that he
slipped on rocks or pebbles located on ZZYZX's sidewalk. Neil has established his claim
strongly enough to preclude summary judgment, at the very least creating several genuine
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issues of material fact.

Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate and Neil Hone

respectfully asks this Court to reverse the lower court's decision.
DATED and SIGNED this/M *~3ay of September, 2003.
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